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The Challenge of Debiasing Personnel Decisions:   
Avoiding Both Under- and Over-Correction 
  
Philip E. Tetlock,* Gregory Mitchell,** and Terry L. Murray***  
  
 
Introduction 
  
This commentary advances two interrelated scientific arguments.  First, we endorse Landy's 
(2008) concerns about the insufficient emphasis placed on individuating information by scholars 
eager to import social-cognition work on stereotyping into employment law. Building on 
Landy’s analysis, we emphasize that greater attention needs to be given to the power 
of accountability and teamwork incentives to motivate personnel decision-makers to seek and 
utilize individuating information that is predictive of job-relevant behavior.  Second, we note 
how easy it is for exchanges between proponents and skeptics of unconscious stereotyping to 
lead to ideological stalemates.  We therefore stress the need for proponents of different 
viewpoints to engage in adversarial collaborations in which the goal is to design studies that each 
camp agrees have the potential to change minds on the conditions under which, and the extent to 
which, unconscious stereotyping is likely to bias personnel decision-making. Without aggressive 
testing of organizational boundary conditions on stereotyping hypotheses, judges, regulators and 
managers will be compelled to rely on their best guesses about what exactly organizations need 
to do–by way of structuring personnel decision processes–to guarantee equality of opportunity. 
  
Access-to-Individuating-Information X Motivation-to-Use-It Interactions 
  
Landy rightly notes that personnel decision-makers almost always have more "individuating" 
information about the specific employees they are judging than lab subjects possess about the 
hypothetical paper people they are judging.  Indeed, in the most extreme case involving the 
Implicit Association Test, subjects are provided with only brief glimpses of faces of different 
racial, ethnic, or sexual make-up and the subjects must pair these faces with positive or negative 
stereotype trait terms as quickly as possible; millisecond differences in reaction time determine 
whether a subject supposedly holds an unconscious positive or negative stereotype of the groups 
represented by the faces.  We challenge social psychologists to come up with a test setting in 
which subjects are provided with less information about the target of a judgment than this.  
These are not “stranger-to-stranger” interactions, to use Landy’s term borrowed from Copus 
(2005); these are not interactions at all. This information-free zone may be appropriate for social-
cognition research into basic-level psychological processes, but it does not provide a sound 
foundation for making inferences about stereotyping in the workplace.  
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Here we would add that personnel decision-makers are often much more motivated to seek out 
and make the best possible use of the available information than are the sophomore conscripts in 
social-cognition experiments. Specifically, we see strong empirical and theoretical grounds for 
the following propositions: 
  
(a) Relative to laboratory subjects who rarely expect to interact with the mostly "paper people"  
they are judging, personnel decision-makers  have strong outcome-interdependence incentives to 
assemble the most productive possible teams and therefore to be on sharp lookout for 
individuating information that confers predictive advantage in spotting those who possess key 
job-relevant skills and who have demonstrated good work ethic. Indeed, Neuberg and Fiske 
(1987; see also Fiske & Neuberg, 1990) show that even relatively weak outcome 
interdependence incentives are sufficient to shift lab subjects to rely less on stereotypic category 
labels and more on individuating information. 
  
(b) Relative to laboratory subjects who usually expect their judgments of paper people to be 
anonymous and devoid of consequences, personnel decision makers often feel accountable to 
high-status others in the organization who expect them to make decisions that simultaneously 
advance the economic efficiency and profitability of the firm and demonstrate the organization's 
commitment to EEO norms. There are good theoretical and empirical reasons for believing that 
these types of accountability pressures will motivate many decision makers to ground their 
judgments in diagnostic job-relevant individuating information--and to monitor their thought 
processes to ensure that inappropriate category-based stereotypes do not influence their 
judgments (see, e.g., Ford et al., 2004; Ruscher & Duval, 1998).  Indeed, Tetlock (1992) and 
Lerner and Tetlock (1999) have reviewed large bodies of research literature that demonstrate that 
even relatively weak lab forms of accountability are sufficient—under the right conditions—to 
check a host of judgmental biases often linked to stereotyping, including insensitivity to 
dissonant evidence (Tetlock, 1983a), over-confidence (Tetlock and Kim, 1987), belief 
perseverance (Tetlock, 1983b), and the fundamental attribution error (Tetlock, 1985).   
 
Navigating Between Under- and Over-Correction 
  
We therefore share Landy’s view that findings from social-psychological studies on stereotypes 
hold little direct relevance for work settings, primarily because these studies typically ignore the 
potentially large interaction effects of individuating information and motivation to use such 
information on the likelihood of reaching accurate and fair conclusions about employees (for the 
much longer version of our argument, see Mitchell & Tetlock, 2006).  Not everyone shares our 
skepticism, however.  Some are confident that laboratory findings on stereotyping will hold up in 
real-world settings (e.g., Bielby, 2003; Kang & Banaji, 2006) and have used this research to 
criticize the personnel processes of organizations that have been sued for employment 
discrimination (e.g., Bielby, 2005; Borgida & Kim, 2007).   
 
If we skeptics are correct, then embracing the prescriptions of the generalizers is likely to lead to 
undue interference with personnel processes and over-correction of bias with real consequences 
(most notably backlash effects from more aggressive diversity efforts or unnecessarily straining 
interactions between unprejudiced Whites and minorities as Whites engage in formal behaviors 
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that minorities interpret as hostility rather than as efforts at bias-controlling impartiality; see Goff 
et al., 2008; Kidder eta al., 2004; Norton et al., 2006; Vorauer & Turpie, 2004).  If the 
generalizers are correct, then considerable work needs to be done to determine how to prevent 
the possibly pernicious effects of unconscious biases in the workplace (see Kalev et al., 2006).  
Accordingly, we believe that high priority should be placed on determining who is correct (or 
rather, on determining the conditions under which the findings from laboratory studies do and do 
not generalize to real world work settings).  
 
Unfortunately, it is all too easy for the two camps to speak past each other. Lab researchers tend 
to see themselves as exploring fundamental perceptual-cognitive processes and see little 
theoretical value in exploring the possible interactive effects of social-context manipulations, 
such as accountability, with their hypothesized processes. If anything, their goals are explicitly 
reductionist and their attention is directed in the opposite level-of-analysis direction, toward ever 
more fine-grained and ultimately neurological characterizations of process mechanisms (e.g., 
Eberhardt, 2005). The reductionists’ attitude toward finding that accountability checks bias 
might well be:  “that is just demand characteristics at work.”  The social-contextualists might 
then reply:  “organizations are loaded with normative rules that are the functional equivalent of 
demand characteristics.” And the reductionists might then counter: “you can temporarily 
suppress unconscious stereotyping with heavy handed accountability manipulations—but the 
biasing effects will simply resurface in other aspects of organizational life.”  To which the social-
contextualists might rejoin: “your framework becomes non-falsifiable if you don’t specify the 
precise boundary conditions for the effects.” 
  
Concerns over avoiding such protracted level-of-analysis stalemates led Tetlock and Mitchell (in 
press) to urge both generalizers and skeptics to engage in a process of scientific dispute 
resolution known as adversarial collaboration (Mellers, Hertwig & Kahneman, 2000), in which 
each side works together to jointly design empirical studies that each agrees, ex ante, have the 
potential to yield data that could induce them to modify their views. 
  
Imagine the following stylized debate. When pressed to be precise about effect sizes in a low-
accountability/high-anonymity control condition, proponents of unconscious stereotyping effects 
estimate that personnel decision-makers see equivalently qualified black promotion candidates 
for job x as 1.2 standard deviations less capable than white candidate. By contrast, skeptics 
estimate the effect to be much smaller on average (say, 0.2 of a standard deviation) and, 
moreover, insist that substantial fractions of the population. Those who score on scales of 
motivation to control prejudice (e.g., Glaser & Knowles, 2008) will either show no bias or even a 
slight-to-moderate pro-black bias.  
 
Let's also posit that, when pressed to be precise about effect sizes in a setting with accountability 
measures in place  designed to check prejudice (measures that mandate procedures to check 
cognitive biases but fall short of mandating equality of result ), proponents of the unconscious-
stereotyping position see such measures as likely to reduce the anti-black bias from 1.2 standard 
deviations to 0.8 standard deviations whereas skeptics see such measures as likely to transform a 
slight anti-black bias into a slight pro-black bias.  
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Speaking for ourselves, if unconscious stereotyping effects held up under reasonably realistic 
accountability-process protections against discrimination, we would indeed feel an obligation to 
scale down our earlier expressed skepticism. And we would hope that if the opposite results 
materialized, generalizers might be more inclined to change their minds. The great advantage is 
that, when each camp signs off on the methodological details before the data are collected, it 
becomes more difficult to criticize the study for methodological defects which can always be 
found ex post.  
 
 Closing comments 
  
The policy stakes in debates over unconscious stereotyping are unusually high.  Stereotyping 
research, including the new research into implicit stereotypes, has become a centerpiece of 
plaintiffs’ cases in employment discrimination class actions (see Monahan, Walker & Mitchell, 
in press).  Prominent plaintiffs’ experts have argued that unconscious stereotyping effects are so 
pervasive and potent that it is reasonable to assume that virtually all managers in a company are 
predisposed to discriminate against particular protected categories of employees whenever there 
is “excessive” subjectivity or discretion in personal decision-making and “inadequate” 
accountability for how personnel decisions are made (e.g., Bielby, 2005).  For these experts, the 
solution is to move to greater objectivity in decision-making (despite evidence that this may not 
serve minorities well; see Roth et al., 2003) and strict monitoring of employment outcomes for 
possible disparities among groups (an approach that is likely to lead to implicit, if not explicit, 
quotas; see Fryer, in press).   
In our view, these applications of stereotype research go far beyond what the existing science can 
support and risk causing perverse effects within organizations.  For all of the reasons that Landy 
sets out, we simply have no empirical basis for believing that personnel decisions studied in 
artificial lab settings approximate personnel decisions in real world settings.  We believe that the 
fastest way to bridge the gap between the lab and the real world, and to do so in a way that 
convinces both skeptics and generlizers, is for researchers from each camp to engage in 
adversarial collaborations that require making reasonably precise, ex ante, predictions in agreed-
upon research designs.  Researchers who are sincerely interested in promoting effective 
debiasing in organizations, and in avoiding the negative effects of under- and over-correction of 
bias, should be willing to engage in this adversarial-collaboration process.  
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